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This article outlines a new approach to the law of political economy as a form of transformative 
law, a new approach that combines a focus on the function of law with a concept of law 
encapsulating the triangular dialectics between the form-giving prestation of law, the material 
substance the law is oriented against, and the transcendence of legal forms—that is, the rendering 
of compatibility between forms. Transformative law thereby serves as an alternative to both law 
and economics and recently emerging culturalist and neo-Marxist approaches. The timing of this 
publication is not coincidental. The era of neoliberalism—that is, of structural liberalism, which 
started in the 1970s and experienced its breakthrough in the 1980s and 1990s after the collapse of 
structural Marxism—is ending. This makes the question of what will succeed the neoliberal 
episteme pertinent. 
                                                            
1 This article presents the Law of Political Economy approach initially developed between 2014 and 2017 
within the European Research Council project ‘Institutional Transformation in European Political Economy 
– A Socio-Legal Approach’ (ITEPE-312331). As such, the article draws upon and expands insights 
presented in Kjaer 2020a, Kjaer 2020b, and Kjaer 2020c as well as a range of other publications related to 
the Law of Political Economy approach. The article thus synthesizes a number of findings and focuses on 




In legal scholarship, the question of the degree of autonomy law enjoys vis-à-vis the rest of society, 
such as the economy, morality, and politics, is a classical topic. Clear examples of this are the 
debates between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, between Lon Fuller and H. L. A. Hart, and 
between Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann. This is rather different within political economy 
scholarship as well as within the part of legal scholarship most directly interested in law’s relation 
to political economy, such as law and economics and various (post-)Marxist approaches as they 
tend to consider law an epiphenomenon.2 Within this sort of scholarship, law and legal instruments 
tend to be regarded as merely reflecting economic interests and power relations and therefore 
enjoying a low level of autonomy and having a limited impact on the course of societal evolution. 
In that vein, criticism of the role of law vis-à-vis the economy and politics is hardly a new thing 
(e.g., Pashukanis 2001). Without being blind to the limitations and contradictions of law, the 
prospect developed here, building on insights presented in The Law of Political Economy: 
Transformation in the Function of Law (Kjaer 2020a), questions this understanding of the role of 
law. It assigns law a prominent role as the central infrastructure of society and hence as constitutive 
for both politics and economy as well as other parts of society.3 This insight is not new but rather 
has a two-hundred-year history—a point we will come back to. The post–World War II liberal 
constitutional settlement of the Western world—that is, the US-centric world, and the legal 
infrastructure enabling the United States to exercise its relative dominance over world society—is 
                                                            
2 There are, of course, important exceptions to this rule, as we will come back to in section 3, discussing 
ordoliberalism and social democratic positions of the immediate post–World War II era.  
3 The perspective presented here is therefore specifically limited to the law of political economy—that is, 
the role of legally structured institutions located in between political and economic processes. It focuses, 
therefore, only to a limited extent on the types of law specifically dealing with political processes, such as 
constitutional and administrative law, or economic processes, such as contract and property law.  
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being challenged and is possibly breaking down before our eyes. Singular events, such as the 
outcome of a presidential election, might slow this development or mitigate the effects to a certain 
extent but are unlikely to change the overall direction, as what can be observed is a far more 
profound structural transformation. 
Structural transformations typically become observable through the emergence of crisis 
semantics.4 Indeed, the list of social phenomena characterized as crisis ridden in contemporary 
society is long: the financial crisis, including its long-term effects (Kjaer et al. 2011); the migrant 
crises along the borders of rich nations and regions as well as throughout the poorer parts of the 
world; the erosion of institutions and the rule of law in countries as different as Brazil, Hungary, 
Poland and Turkey; the effects of climate change; the still ongoing COVID-19 health crisis and its 
socioeconomic fallout; sustained social inequality; and many more. These phenomena do not 
constitute a singular crisis that can be traced back to a unitary logic—for example, the capitalist 
logic—but rather constitute a range of different but mutually reinforcing crises unfolding in 
different modi and temporal logics (Kjaer and Olsen 2016). Some of them are therefore global in 
reach, while others are specific to the Western world or to specific countries. Indeed, the feeling 
of crisis is, for the time being, not an experience that is shared by many in (for example) East Asia, 
who see rising living standards and increased global centrality for their region. It is therefore not 
surprising that the apocalyptic eschatology, widespread in Western popular culture and popular 
sentiment these days, is Western and not global (Cowan 2011). This apocalyptic eschatology might 
be seen as tied to the end of Western hegemony in general and the end of the hegemony of white 
males in particular, rather than reflecting crises with a global reach. Only Westerners 
systematically overestimating their importance in the world could characterize the 2008 financial 
                                                            
4 For different definitions of societal crises, see Kjaer 2011.  
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crisis as a “global financial crisis” (Wikipedia 2021) when it was, in fact, largely a domestic US 
and UK crisis, albeit it produced severe spillovers in other jurisdictions, triggering different kinds 
of economic crises in countries such as Greece and Spain. 
 
If there is one overarching element binding the multiple crises together, it might be that they can 
be understood as a crisis of modernization. This crisis, which became visible in 1914 and unfolded 
until 1945, was a reflection of the structural transformation leading to the end of the Eurocentric 
world after the rise of Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The current crisis reflects 
the end of the Western-centric—that is, US-centric—world after the rapid modernization of China 
and other parts of the world. Or, to put it in sociological terms, the crisis we see unfolding reflects 
another step in the expansion of world society—that is, modernization—through the expansion of 
the primacy of functional differentiation throughout the world (Kjaer 2014, 103ff.). The crisis of 
the first half of the twentieth century had catastrophic effects and also this time, large parts of the 
world, in the West and elsewhere, seem to be moving into Weimar territory. Institutions and norms 
once assumed certain are increasingly challenged or outright collapsing, and overall societal 
coherency is waning (Kjaer and Olsen 2016). The major difference seems to be that while the 
enactment of “the decline of the West” (Spengler 2017)5 played out as tragedy in its first staging, 
the reenactment we are currently seeing has so far played out as farce. This farcical aspect has 
been expressed in a multitude of ways, from the Churchillian fantasies of the UK prime minister 
to the Ottoman dreams of the Turkish president and the infantile rhetoric and strange haircuts 
shared by many of today’s strongmen.6 In spite of its phoniness, the ongoing erosion of the 
                                                            
5 The German 1918/22 original speaks of “Abendland,” meaning the Occident understood as Western 
Europe, not the Western world in the contemporary sense.  
6 Silvio Berlusconi’s Italy might be considered the first expression of this development. For an early 
understanding of the problem, see Crouch 2004. 
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institutional infrastructure of world society calls for a reflection on the concept of law and the 
function of legal instruments. The constitutive, enabling, and limiting functions of law are in need 
of recalibration in order to stay relevant under the changed structural conditions of the twenty-first 
century (Kjaer 2020c). A coherent concept of law capable of unifying these functions in a way that 
is relevant for the twenty-first century might be termed transformative law, a point we will return 
to. Transformative law constitutes social phenomena by giving form to them in a manner implying 
that they—through the legal form—are made capable of transcending that very form. 
 
2. At the End of an Episteme: The World beyond Neoliberalism 
More than a decade has gone by since the outbreak of the financial crisis—a phony decade in 
which the rules pinned down in the economics textbooks were systematically broken and any sense 
of a coherent economic policy approach based on sound theoretical foundations melted away. 
Nonetheless, surprisingly little changed in the first years after the financial crisis, leading to claims 
of the “strange non-death of neoliberalism” (Crouch 2011). Neoliberalism is in many ways an 
empty signifier into which one can read many different positions. Believers in “pure capitalism” 
will even deny its very existence. When used in its broadest possible sense, the term might be 
considered an umbrella concept of the dominant—that is, hegemonic—economic and political 
theories and praxes from the 1970s until today (Biebricher 2019). Concretely, neoliberalism might 
thus be understood as an episteme (Foucault 1966), integrating a paradigm and a praxis of 
knowledge in relation to a whole string of areas and phenomena such as “governance,” “new public 
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management,” and “monetarism” as well as, somewhat controversially, “global human rights” and 
“global justice” (Moyn 2018).7 
 
Within law, the most dominant version of neoliberalism is law and economics—that is, the attempt 
to conceptualize and solve legal problems with microeconomic tools. While mainly deployed in 
private law settings and especially in business law, the law and economics assumptions of 
methodological individualism, strategic rationality aimed at utility maximization, and notions of 
markets that self-correct through striving toward equilibrium have permeated many aspects of 
modern society. These assumptions has led to epistemological capture and hegemony reflected in 
the difficulty to articulate and deploy alternative approaches (Deakin 2020). While law and 
economics is mainly a US-American phenomenon, even areas of law such as EU competition law, 
where distinct differences to the US-American approach are routinely celebrated, are de facto 
relying on the approaches developed in Chicago (Bartalevich 2017). 
 
In spite of such global influences, the United States remains the place where the societal impact of 
law and economics has been most profound and systematic. The consequence has been an erosion 
of the functional and normative integrity of public power, as expressed through rampant social 
inequality, eroded public institutions, and contested legitimacy of public decision-making. In spite 
of enjoying more than $65,000 per capita GNI (World Bank 2021), the United States has 
increasingly revealed features normally associated with what the World Bank characterizes as 
upper middle-income countries, defined as countries with a per capita GNI between $4,046 and 
                                                            
7 While most scholarship using the term neoliberalism does so in a negatively loaded sense, the term is used 




$12,535 (World Bank 2020). In the post–World War II era, developed countries, in either the 
Soviet or the Western version, were the dominant countries and the ideal types that other countries 
tended to orient themselves toward. In contrast, the defining feature of the early twenty-first 
century is that the categories of “developed” and “developing” countries have increasingly melted 
together. The dominant category of world society today is that of “gray-in-gray states”: that is, 
states that are “developed” and “underdeveloped” at the same time; states that typically are not 
outright dictatorships but also are not well-functioning democracies; states that are not poor but 
also not rich, and characterized by massive and sustained inequality of the distribution of capital 
in all its forms; states that have strong capabilities to randomly deploy organized violence but that 
also have dysfunctional and compromised institutions of public power and hence limited capacity 
to pursue across-the-board polices and to ensure the sustained implementation and 
institutionalization of such policies.8 
When observed from a Western angle, this development can be described as a “Brazilianization of 
the West,” as predicted by Ulrich Beck (Beck 1999). Although this development is a structural 
feature visible throughout the Western world, the United States and the United Kingdom are the 
Western countries where it has advanced the most. These are also the countries where 
neoliberalism, including law and economics, happens to have advanced the most. Indeed, 
neoliberalism in general, and law and economics in particular, can be understood as directly 
oriented toward a breakdown of public power, understood as abstract, generalized, and hence 
                                                            
8 Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and increasingly the 
United States have some, though not necessarily all, of the characteristics mentioned above. China, on the 
other hand, might, to the extent its political economy model proves to be sustainable, provide an alternative 
model of authoritarian state capitalism. When the universal political economy model of continental 
northwestern Europe is added as another outlier, the contours appear of a new global typology of political 
economies, with three different worlds of political economies centered respectively around dysfunctional 
populism, authoritarian state capitalism, and egalitarian universalism. 
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depersonalized power (Kjaer 2017; Neumann 1996). The entire thrust of the microeconomic 
approach is to split up the singularity and comprehensiveness of the state, the main though not the 
only repository of public power, through the introduction of competition, outsourcing, and 
privatization as well as redistribution in favor of the higher end of the income spectrum. Doing so 
systematically challenges the already porous public/private divide, allowing for private interests 
to enter the realm of public power in an increasingly unfiltered manner, while public power can 
enter the private realm in a fragmented form—a fragmentation that implies that albeit formally 
public power, it no longer acts as such. Instead, fragmented public power becomes increasingly 
instrumentalized and arbitrary, acting as a vehicle for the advancement of private interests (Kjaer 
2016). 
The still ongoing erosion of the functional and normative integrity of public power is in itself a 
crisis among the many crises of contemporary society—a crisis that, to a large extent, has been 
caused by the neoliberal episteme in combination with more profound structural developments. 
Just as theories seldom are proven wrong in the Popperian sense but rather fade away when they 
lose their allure and capacity to provide a convincing narrative, the neoliberal episteme is fizzling 
out, with the vacuity currently filled by authoritarianism and populism. This begs the question: is 
there an alternative to authoritarianism and populism as the successor episteme to neoliberalism? 
As Thomas Kuhn noted on the basis of insights harvested from Ludwik Fleck (1980) and Arthur 
Koestler (2014), “a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternate candidate is available 
to take its place” (Kuhn 1996, 77). Extrapolated to epistemes, this insight might explain the 
“strange non-death of neoliberalism” as the neoliberal episteme continued as the world’s caretaker 
government for another decade after the implosion of its functional and normative integrity during 
the financial crisis because of the lack of an obvious replacement. Instead of an actual replacement, 
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the phony version of authoritarianism and populism, resembling a Baudrillardian reality show 
more than “real politics,” has so far filled the void (Kjaer 2020c). 
 
Within economics, the combined forces of Esther Duflo, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, Gabriel 
Zucman, and others provide the contours of a new (French) paradigm of economics—a paradigm 
that seeks to fill the void after the monetarist paradigm, although such a paradigm also would have 
to become an episteme combining theory and praxis in order to replace the phony version of 
authoritarianism and populism. However, within law in general, and within economic law 
specifically, the contours of a new paradigm—not to speak of a new episteme—are not yet in sight 
(Kjaer 2020c). The sustainability of political decisions in the longer term is conditioned by the sort 
of infrastructural power that legal and economic epistemes offer, as the contentlessness of phony 
authoritarianism and populism is unlikely to be sustainable in the longer term. It is with this 
background in mind that a new concept of law capable of recalibrating the functions of law in a 
manner suitable for the twenty-first century is needed. 
3. History: The Road to Renewal 
The first place to look for renewal is in history. What sorts of paradigms, epistemes, insights, and 
approaches are out there, maybe forgotten or slumbering, which in modified form can be 
reactivated? What historical experiences might serve as warnings concerning which road not to 
take, thus enabling historical learning processes (Eder 1991) on the basis of institutionalized 
memory (Luhmann 1997, 576ff.)? 
Modern legal epistemes came in three different versions: interwar corporatism, post–World War 
II neocorporatism, and the type of governance law, including law and economics, which emerged 
from the 1970s onward and which has been dominant in the last four decades. As outlined in The 
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Law of Political Economy and elsewhere, the concept of law unfolded in interwar corporatism and 
late twentieth-century governance share a number of features: firstly, a holistic notion of society; 
secondly, a sectorial outlook, in praxis representing an in-built contradiction to the holistic outlook; 
and, thirdly, a rejection of the rule of law and legal formalism and their substitution with 
informality. At the same time, they are each other’s exact opposites or mirror images, as corporatist 
law advanced notions of hierarchy and planning on the basis of an ideal of unbound political 
energy, while governance law is linked to an ideal of spontaneous exchanges on the market as the 
ultimate form of social exchange. Hence, governance law is corporatist law turned upside down 
(Kjaer 2020b). 
That corporatist and governance law are mirror images of each other is also expressed through 
their shared tendency to instrumentalize law for narrowly defined objectives. In corporatist law, 
this is expressed in the concept of the dual state, which allowed for two legal universes: a universe 
of positivist law oriented toward the economy on the basis of norms (Normenstaat) and a universe 
of unrestrained political action safeguarded through law (Maßnahmenstaat) (Frankel 2017). 
Governance law inverts this figure through the delineation with legal means of an economic 
universe free from political intervention. The economy is sought constitutionalized on the basis of 
very specific economic principles, as apparent, for example, in relation to central banking and 
trade and investment law, with the purpose of lending them an entrenching authority aimed at 
excluding alternative epistemes. As the foundation for safeguarding the economy is derived from 
economic theory, relying on formalistic analytical modeling, this type of social organizing is also 
being characterized as an expression of neoformalism (Nourse and Shaffer 2009; Frerichs 2020). 
Similar insights can be found in the work of Duncan Kennedy, one of the contributors to The Law 
of Political Economy. Kennedy argued back in 2006 that the world of modern globalized law 
11 
 
consisted of three paradigmatic epochs: German classical legal thought (1850–1914), French 
social law (1914–68), and what might be called a US-centric globalizing legal paradigm (1968–
2000s) (Kennedy 2006). Epochs are never named before they come to their end, and the last of 
these epochs is still in the process of obtaining its defining name. It therefore goes by several 
names, including neoliberal, neoformalist, and governance law. Irrespective of its name and the 
preferred division of epochs, this episteme probably imploded somewhere between the 2008 
financial crisis and today; this fact means that we are witnessing the end of an epoch and looking 
into an unknown future. 
This also raises the question: can the neocorporatist law of the immediate post–World War II era 
serve as a template for renewal? A widespread degree of nostalgia can be observed among scholars, 
especially those with left-wing inclinations, for what they consider the golden age Keynesian 
nation-state of the trente glorieuses and the Wirtschaftswunder (e.g., Streeck 2009). This is a 
problematic stance functionally and normatively (Kjaer 2019c). While the post–World War II 
period indeed implied a move toward unprecedented affluence (Galbraith 1998) and also provided 
a very high level of political and social stability in comparison to the interwar period, these changes 
first of all happened under very specific structural conditions demographically, economically, 
educationally, politically, and technologically. Secondly, the normative setup was centered on a 
male-breadwinner model that broke down decades ago in the Western world, just as the general 
normative setup was hardly attractive for those who were not Christian, heterosexual, male, and 
white. Thirdly, the trente glorieuses and the Wirtschaftswunder were associated with a very small 
albeit strategically important part of the world, essentially situated around the North Atlantic—a 
part of the world that today not only hosts a far smaller part of the world’s population but also 
bundles far less of the world’s resources than it did in the mid-twentieth century. Fourthly and 
12 
 
finally, the nostalgists tend to ignore the fact that the golden age Keynesian nation-states were in 
fact transnationally constituted (Kjaer 2019c). For the nostalgists, the nation-state is an 
ontologically given and hence stable frame within which socialism can unfold. As such, the 
position of the nostalgists represents an unfortunate marriage between nationalism and socialism, 
and it is therefore not surprising that they tend to consider transnational ordering as a threat 
(Streeck 2016). Apart from being false, such a narrative is also counterproductive and—if one 
wants to take a political stand—dangerous, as under current conditions it plays directly into the 
narrative of political movements such as Alternative für Deutschland, Rassemblement national, 
and the currently dominating segments of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom and the 
Republican Party in the United States. 
Neocorporatist law, however, provides a template for renewal in a deeper, infrastructural sense. 
As a reaction to the interwar period and starting with the publication of the Beveridge Report in 
1942 (Beveridge 1942), substantial changes were introduced in the infrastructural setup of public 
power and its relation to private power in Western Europe as well as elsewhere throughout the 
Western world.9 These setups were characterized by a reliance on legal formalization and were 
aimed at simultaneously separating and reconnecting politics and economy as well as various other 
systemic formations such as education, science, and religion within the legal form. As such, law 
provided a framework for the synchronization—that is, the integration—of society (Kjaer 2014b). 
In praxis, formalized and legally constituted negotiation systems emerged where translations and 
exchanges between capital, labor, and political power could occur just as legally regulated 
autonomous professions became central stabilizers in society. Such institutional formations had, 
                                                            
9 In the United States, the developments from the New Deal to the Great Society programs of the mid-1960s 
implied a similar development, although in a very different context than in Western Europe. 
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of course, existed in previous times too. The central novelty was that for the first time, they became 
across-the-board nationwide frameworks. Around 1900 only two countries in Europe, Denmark 
and Switzerland, had what resembled singular and nationwide institutional formations in relation 
to labor market issues (Crouch 1993, 67ff.). After 1945 such formations became a far more 
widespread phenomenon throughout Western Europe. For the first time, public power, defined as 
generalized and abstract and hence impersonal power, became structurally dominant (Brunkhorst 
2014, 421ff.). This form of power was located in the institutional repository of the state but also 
in formally private formations such as unions, trade associations, and professional bodies that 
implemented across-the-board policies and universal inclusion on the basis of legal procedures 
(Schmitter 1974). Hence, the category and boundaries of the state were transcended, as it no longer 
was possible to force public power back into the straitjacket of the state. Indeed, an important 
reason for the interwar catastrophe was the ever more desperate attempts—conceptually and 
practically—to force a society with a degree of complexity exceeding what the category of the 
state could possibly absorb into that very category.10 
Neocorporatist post–World War II law rested on a compromise, as expressed in the term social 
market economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft), as developed in the context of the German Federal 
Republic by Alfred Müller-Armack (1960). This compromise allowed both center-right social 
conservatives, such as the ordoliberals, and center-left social democrats and various in-between 
positions to claim victory. The former was—broadly speaking—associated with scholars such as 
Franz Böhm, Walter Eucken, Wilhelm Röpke, and Alexander Rüstow, and the latter—in various 
degrees—with scholars such as Herman Heller, Otto Kahn-Freund, Franz Neumann, and Hugo 
                                                            
10 An exercise that was repeated in the 1970s and 1980s by Marxist state theorists who added layer after 
layer to the category of the state in the increasingly futile attempt to capture societal developments. 
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Sinzheimer. The institutional compromise erected was possible because the two movements, in 
spite of antagonistic debates (Joerges 2010), respectively represented right- and left-Hegelian 
positions. Consequently, they shared fundamental Hegelian assumptions and insights in relation 
to the functional differentiation of society and the fundamental function of law in society, seeing 
law as the constitutive framework and central infrastructure of society. Accordingly, they could 
both identify the central societal function of law in the way law simultaneously separated and 
reconnected systemic societal spheres, such as economy and politics and others spheres.11 
4. The Return of Polarization  
While the scholarly and political positions dominating the immediate post–World War II era were 
located in the center, it is the outliers on the continuum that dominate in today’s world. The 
increased attention to outliers is probably a reflection of the challenge to the liberal order and 
Western dominance as well as the collapse of the neoliberal episteme. The popularity of outliers 
is most clearly expressed in the continued attractiveness of the works of Friedrich August von 
Hayek (1994) and Karl Polányi (2001). Both Hayek and Polányi developed theories aimed at 
explaining why totalitarianism had emerged and how to avoid its resurgence. The answers they 
gave were, however, exact opposites: Hayek identified political interventionism in the economy 
as the core problem, whereas Polányi argued that the problem was the absence of political 
interventionism (Kjaer 2020b). This divide is reiterated today in the standoff between neoliberal 
proponents of law and economics and public choice, on the one hand, and left-wing movements 
such as the Cologne School of political economy, on the other hand. In both cases, moreover, a 
                                                            
11 The Hegelian heritage here was largely confined to what might be described as Hegel’s historical-
sociological writings, most notably in Elements of the Philosophy of Right, providing an empirically based 
description of emergent tendencies of modern society and statehood. This made it possible to draw on 
Hegel’s theory of society without necessarily buying into the full Hegelian system. 
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particular radical interpretation implying a downgrading of the role of law in society has gained 
ground since the 1970s. For the former, that is especially expressed through Milton Friedman’s 
radicalized version of neoliberalism, which, in contrast to Hayek, considered law merely an 
instrument to be deployed on the basis of economic calculus and with an economic objective. For 
the latter, this is expressed through a reactionary, communitarian, and methodological culturalist 
right-Polányian approach—an approach that assumes the existence of chessboard-style fixed 
national universes within which capitalist institutions operate and move, or the existence of 
unbridgeable cultural divides between national cultures (Kjaer 2020b). 
Polányi’s The Great Transformation provides, in spite of its many fine qualities, a critique of 
modern society on the basis of a highly idealized fiction of premodern society, seeing a 
communitarian utopia as the alternative to modern capitalism. Polányi’s historical reconstruction 
of the stages in the autonomization of the economy and its reproductive logic and the consequences 
hereof is, moreover, deeply skewed by the failure to recognize that striving for value surplus and 
tendencies of autonomization and acceleration can be found throughout society and not just in the 
economy (Kjaer 2020b, 9f.). Left-Polányians have sought to transform these insights into a 
question of democracy and hence into a progressive agenda on the basis of a notion of society that 
conceives of it as equal to a singular polity—that is, by making politics rather than the economy 
the supreme and all-encompassing system (e.g., Klein 2020). While this softens the stance 
compared to the right-Polányians, both seek to substitute the implicit holism of market thinking 
based on equilibrium models with another kind of holism. Latter-day Polányists end up merely 
substituting market holism with cultural or political holism (Kjaer 2020c). 
While the post–World War II settlement was made possible through a move to the center in both 
scholarly and political terms, the current Hayekian versus Polányian standoff is a semantic 
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reflection of the increased polarization of the Western part of world society. Another example of 
increased polarization is the attempt to counter the dominance of law and economics by the New 
Haven law and political economy (LPE) movement. The core claim of the New Haven LPE 
movement is not that law is an epiphenomenon of political economy but rather that law is the 
critical infrastructure of political economies (Britton-Purdy et al. 2017). This insight is both correct 
and crucial, but it is hardly new. Rather, it was one of the basic arguments of Hegel’s Elements of 
the Philosophy of Right, which turns two hundred years old this year (Hegel 1970). As already 
pointed out, both right- and left-Hegelians have furthermore maintained this view throughout—
that is, both the ordoliberals and the social democratically inclined scholars such as Herman Heller, 
Otto Kahn-Freund, Franz Neumann, and Hugo Sinzheimer had this insight as their basic premise. 
As reconstructed by Christian Joerges and Michelle Everson in chapter 2 of The Law of Political 
Economy, the German term Wirtschaftsrecht (economic law) covers and includes this insight as 
well. In fact, the dispute in the 1960s and 1970s between Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker and Rudolf 
Wiethölter, as reconstructed by Joerges and Everson, in many ways encapsulates the birth of 
modern European LPE, as the dispute largely was concerned with the right meaning of the term 
Wirtschaftsrecht understood as the law of political economy (Joerges and Everson 2020). 
Although it was sold as a revelation, it is, from a strictly scholarly perspective, difficult to see 
exactly where the novelty of the New Haven version of LPE should be found. A reason for this 
might be that it is primarily a political and only secondarily a scholarly movement. This is also 
reflected in the New Haven manifesto published in November 2017, as it, in its aesthetic style and 
substantial direction, has far more to do with a political declaration than with a research program 
(Britton-Purdy et al. 2017). The “primacy of the political” is also attested by the fact that “theories 
of the right” also acknowledging the crucial role of law on political economy are systematically 
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rooted out and ignored. The first criteria of selection is political conviction; scholarly quality is the 
second. In this sense, one might argue that the New Haven version of LPE is closer to Lenin than 
Marx. Although his work deeply influenced political movements on the full spectrum from social 
democracy to Stalinism, Marx was primarily a scholar and only secondarily a political activist. 
Lenin, on the other hand, was primarily a professional revolutionary and only secondarily a 
scholar, systematically instrumentalizing scholarly insights for a political project. 
The fundamentally political nature of the Yale LPE initiative is also reflected in the slogan-style 
advocacy for a move “from efficiency to power,” “from neutrality to equality,” and from “anti-
politics to democracy” (Britton-Purdy et al. 2020). The initiative, however, suffers from missing 
scholarly foundations. No concept of society seems to be available. Rather, it provides a deeply 
idiosyncratic approach, as 99 percent of the issues, conflicts, and problems addressed are related 
to the US-American context, just as the history of the coming into being of the “Twentieth-Century 
Synthesis” and its subsequent unraveling is reconstructed as an exclusively US-American story 
(Britton-Purdy et al. 2020). In short, it is simply assumed that the society we are talking about is 
the US-American society and hence a nation-state society. This is hardly an adequate foundation 
for the development of a concept of law suitable for the twenty-first century (a point we will return 
to). When taking a global perspective, the idiosyncratic US focus furthermore speaks directly 
against the self-declared objective of “equality.” Unreflectively and most likely unwillingly, it 
reinforces a narrative of a US-centric world and hence underpins one of the most blatant examples 
of inequality in world society. 
But the issue of equality goes further than that. When the French noblesse de robe (nobles of the 
gown) launched a coup d’état against the noblesse d’épée (nobles of the sword) in 1789, they 
claimed to speak for the entire population, although the broader population largely were bystanders 
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(Elias 1997). Indeed, one of the classic situations of history is that well-intended revolutionaries 
with self-proclaimed emancipatory projects are faced with the paradox that they are part of the 
establishment they wish to overturn. The New Haven version of LPE falls exactly into this 
category. Traditionally, Latin American universities are the world leaders when it comes to the 
production of (unnoticed) scholarly manifestos. Scholarly manifestos are a particular genre 
characterized by the rejection of the distinction between politics and scholarship. Somewhat 
ironically, the traction of the New Haven manifesto might in this sense be considered a reflection 
of the increased “Brazilianization” of the US-American context. The New Haven LPE manifesto 
represents a specific energy-loaded moment in which “Brazilianization” has already occurred 
while the credentials of supremacy remaining from the previous world are still showing their 
effect. The world systems of higher education and research might be highly standardized (Thomas 
et al. 1987, 133ff.) and functionally delineated (Stichweh 2000) vis-à-vis other segments of world 
society, but internally they are also highly stratified. In this context, the institutions at the top serve 
as verifiers of knowledge. Information published on blogs or elsewhere is not considered valid or 
of high value before an institution at the top of the hierarchy has corroborated it. These top 
institutions furthermore tend to have consecration and elite reproduction as their primary function, 
while scholarly advancement or excellence remains secondary (Bourdieu 1989). Hence, statements 
made countless of times, such as those included in the New Haven LPE manifesto, gained the 
necessary status only when adopted by Yale. If the New Haven LPE manifesto had been published 
on a blog originating in Botswana, Mexico, or Nebraska, no one would have noticed or cared. In 
this sense, the manifesto represents a performative contradiction, as the effects produced by the 
manifesto are highly undesirable according to its own standards. In other words, if one were to 
take the manifesto seriously as a political document, the first thing to torch, literally or 
19 
 
metaphorically, would have to be the New Haven campus, before proceeding to the rest of the Ivy 
League. 
When viewed as a scholarly document, the previously mentioned absence of a concept of society 
is not the only thing that is striking. There also does not seem to be an elaborated concept of law 
guiding the endeavor. Law seems to be considered primarily a political instrument and legal 
discourse and institutions a political battlefield. The objective to produce a shift “from efficiency 
to power,” “from neutrality to equality,” and from “anti-politics to democracy” (Britton-Purdy et 
al. 2020, 1818ff.) is characterized by the absence of any deeper sociological understanding of the 
condition of possibility of law, its form and effects, its potentials and limitations. As an example, 
the notion of power advanced is a classical Weberian one, which enables one to concentrate on 
simplified questions such as “who has” or “who should” hold power on the basis of a 
methodological individualist worldview and a conception of power as bargaining power—that is, 
the capability of exerting influence over others (Britton-Purdy et al. 2020, 1820; Weber 1980, 
122ff.). The numerous alternative and in most cases far more refined concepts of power 
transcending crude subjectivist assumptions available since at least the mid-twentieth century (e.g., 
Arendt 1970; Foucault 2001; Kjaer 2010, 85ff.; Luhmann [1975] 2012; Lukes 1986; Sciulli 1992) 
are not taken into account, just as no new concept is developed. As such, the foundations remain 
ultimately the same as the ones found within neoclassical economics in general and law and 
economics specifically. In both cases, the concept of power is not only reductionist in itself but 
also derived from a reductionist concept of rationality, as Jürgen Habermas went to great lengths 
to illustrate forty years ago through his critique of Weberian strategic rationality and his 
subsequent broadening of the concept through the inclusion of social and dramaturgical rationality 
(Habermas 1995, 489ff.). As such, the New Haven LPE project seems devoid of a deeper 
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knowledge interest (Erkenntnisinteresse) constituting an advancement of knowledge in a scholarly 
sense. If a primarily political endeavor can be classified as scholarship at all, pragmatism might 
therefore be the most suitable term to describe the endeavor—a form of pragmatism that, rather 
than propelling an advancement of knowledge, contributes to the lock-in of predictable, 
ideologically infused positions where the two sides act as mirror images of each other. 
5. A New Concept of Transformative Law  
As stated in the first paragraph of The Law of Political Economy, developing a sound theoretical 
approach capable of overcoming the unfruitful ideologization of legal and political economy 
scholarship might be a productive alternative to the currently dominating approaches (Kjaer 2020b, 
1). Indeed, a core objective of the European Research Council project on “Institutional 
Transformation in European Political Economy—A Socio-Legal Approach (ITEPE),” launched in 
2014, was to develop a theory and an approach capable of describing and assessing the role of law 
in structuring political and economic processes and the relation between them. A theory striving 
to avoid prestructured and hence predictable ideological positions that are either affirmative or 
critical of specific modes of economic reproduction while still acknowledging that social and legal 
theory can have profound political effects. While this aim also was central to the seventh ITEPE 
conference, in July 2017, leading to publication of The Law of Political Economy, the project goes 
far deeper than that. 
The Law of Political Economy has the subtitle Transformation in the Function of Law, indicating 
an intrinsic relationship between function, time, and change. This perspective has two dimensions: 
First, internal formal and substantive transformations of the law and the legal system. This is very 
much the perspective developed in The Law of Political Economy, as it largely remains confined 
to an internalist perspective on how law conceives of and reconstructs political and economic 
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processes and their interrelation. Second, an external perspective on how law acts as a medium for 
the transformation of society and nonlegal societal processes. This perspective is at the forefront 
of the cutting-edge work undertaken at the Amsterdam Center for Transformative Private Law 
(Bartl 2020; Eller 2020). An exhaustive concept will, however, need to combine and integrate the 
two into a dual endogenous and exogenous framework.12 This might be done on the basis of a 
concept of transformative law encapsulating the triangular dialectics between form giving (i.e., 
constituting social phenomena, the material substance the law is oriented against) and the 
transcendence of that form (i.e., the rendering of compatibility between forms).  
In order to arrive at such a comprehensive concept, a minimum of three preliminary steps briefly 
outlined beneath are, however, needed: the development of an adequate concept of society, a 
mapping of the conflict lines unfolding within that society, and an assessment of the strategic 
location and impact of different systemically organized processes in society. Building on top of 
these largely sociological insights and the understanding of the function of law emerging from 
them, it becomes possible to distill elements of a transformative concept of law. 
 
5.1. From the Individualistic Premise to World Society  
Margaret Thatcher famously twisted Karl Popper’s variant of methodological individualism 
beyond recognition by stating that “there’s no such thing as society” (Thatcher 1987). This 
proposition is at the very center of the neoliberal episteme, and the problems facing the Western 
part of world society can be traced back largely to this ontological starting point. The dominant 
worldview of the last four decades was derived from a methodologically individualist premise 
                                                            




leading to the assumption that the sum of actions of individuals equals society. This unreflective 
jump from micro to macro pops up in political, economic, and legal discourses concerning 
everything from campaign financing in the United States (Supreme Court of the United States 
2010) to EU competition law and policy (Bartalevich 2017). However, the methodologically 
individualist premise is central not only to law and economics but also to human rights law, the 
core focus point and instrument of self-proclaimed progressive movements in the last four decades 
(Moyn 2018). While human rights are a pivotal element of modern legal orders and play a crucial 
role in world society, they are an insufficient focus point and instrument for the creation of across-
the-board institutional frameworks aimed at establishing societal coherency. 
 
Both law and economics and the progressive human rights agenda of the last four decades share 
the poverty of methodological individualism. The central problem of the neoliberal episteme and 
of its self-proclaimed human rights–oriented progressive mirror image is their failure to recognize 
networks, organizations, and institutions as social phenomena in their own right—that is, as objects 
of study and agents of change, producing autonomous effects on society. As forcefully and 
convincingly argued by David Sciulli, the consequence is that both law and policy lose sight of 
systemic effects, asymmetric power, and issues of societal integration (Sciulli 1992; Sciulli 2001). 
For epistemes departing from an individualistic premise, societal coherency and synchronization 
are not an issue because there is no concept of society available to enable an articulation of society 
as a social phenomenon in its own right. The starting point for a new law of political economy 
might therefore be found in the development of a concept of society that is compatible with legal 
reasoning and dispute resolution. Conceptually, this means that theories that entail a specific and, 
in principle, all-encompassing concept of society, such as both left- and right-Hegelian and left- 
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and right-Luhmannian theories, could stand in front of a renaissance. In practical terms, it would 
moreover mean that overall societal impact (i.e., levels of socioeconomic equality, territorial 
cohesion, and the broader societal impact of business activities beyond the creation of share value) 
should and could obtain a more definitive and decisive role in legal regulation—a form of societal 
impact that is not equal to the sum of individual preferences or actions (Kjaer 2020c). 
 
Another core insight is that an adequate concept of society would have to be a concept of world 
society and not a concept of nation-state society. The idea that states are weaker today than in 
previous historical periods is, although widespread, empirically unfounded. In spite of the damage 
inflicted by neoliberalism, we have not only more states today than in previous historical times but 
also more states that are institutionally stable and capable of exercising micromanagement—that 
is, to regulate social processes in a very high degree of detail—than ever before (Kjaer 2014a, 
31ff.). Nonetheless, states are not containers of society. On the contrary, it is society that frames 
states. Throughout their existence, states have been islands in a far bigger societal ocean 
characterized by highly interconnected social processes in relation to economy, education, mass 
media, religion, science, and so forth. As persuasively reconstructed by Hauke Brunkhorst, such 
processes have literally transcended the centripetal forces of localistic politics since before the 
axial age and hence for thousands of years (Brunkhorst 2014, 59ff.). The image of states as islands 
rather than as containers is also reflected in the functional limitation of the form of generalized 
public power of which states are the most important but not the only central repository. Public 
power is—as we will discuss again later—legally constituted and merely has an infrastructural and 
not a substantial capability. Public power cannot appreciate the depth of a religious sentiment, 
determine the validity of a scientific argument, capture the rationale of a business transaction, or 
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assess the quality of a piece of art. So while an absence of generalized public power makes societal 
coherency impossible, this absence does not imply that generalized public power is supreme to the 
rest of society or that society can be considered as captured or framed by public power in a 
substantial or a holistic sense (Kjaer 2017). As also argued in The Law of Political Economy, 
mainstream conceptions of politics, just like mainstream conceptions of economy, suffer from 
ontological deficiencies derived from the holistic thinking of seventeenth-century body politics. 
Modern public power–based politics is, however, not body politics in the seventeenth-century 
sense (Kjaer 2020b; Neumann 1996). 
 
A very clear example of the inadequacies of individualistic and state-centric approaches is that of 
global value chains (GVCs), ranging from their early colonial version to present-day digitalized 
and spatially synchronized versions (Baars et al. 2016; Eller 2017; Kjaer 2018; Salminen and 
Rajavuori 2019). GVCs serve as the central infrastructure of the global economy and consist of 
chains of contracts at times involving thousands of firms, millions of employees, and billions in 
investments. They have a profound impact on the institutional setup of corporations, labor markets, 
financial bodies, and many other crucial institutional formations throughout the globe, just as their 
synchronization of operations on a global scale provides one of the most ample contributions to 
the reality of world society (Kjaer 2018). The attempts to capture GVCs through both national law 
and due diligence–based human rights terms are therefore inadequate. GVCs not only transgress 
national jurisdictions but also create a functional and normative need for enabling and limiting 
legal forms that provide societal coherency through a reliance on elaborated institutional 
frameworks. These forms cannot merely be derived from individualistic human rights–based 
approaches incapable of addressing issues such as the need for institutional solutions through 
25 
 
across-the-board labor market and welfare measures and generalized environmental protection 
schemes. 
 
5.2. From Hegemony to Interlegality 
 
One of the many implications emerging from taking world society and globalized social processes, 
including political and economic processes, as the starting point is that law cannot be reduced to 
the dual categories of national and international law. Apart from national and international law, 
transnational and community-based living law also fulfill central functions in world society.13 As 
we will return to later in this article, these four types of law might potentially also act as sources 
of interlegal global law to the extent that they are deployed in an intercontextual manner (Kjaer 
2019a). Interlegal global law exists in two versions: The first is universal imperial law, the 
dominant form of global law until the implosion of the Austro-Hungarian, Chinese, German, 
Ottoman, and Russian Empires between 1911 and 1922. The second is the assemblages of legal 
and managerial techniques deployable in an unspecified number of geographic locations, which 
was characteristic of colonial law, as it emerged from the late fifteenth century onward, as well as 
contemporary GVC law (Kjaer 2019a). 
 
In this context, a central dimension of the history of world society from 1492 onward is the history 
of consecutive Western states (Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States) 
acting as institutional anchors of the world economy. While never leading to the eradication of 
other legal orders, the role as the anchor nation ensured them a hegemonic role and an exorbitant 
                                                            
13 For definitions of these types of law, see Kjaer 2019a. 
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privilege. These states served as guarantors of the institutional formations enabling global 
economic exchanges—that is, providing a global reserve currency, a willingness and a capability 
to use force to maintain “global order,” and legal constructions justifying the existing order. The 
current anchor, the United States, is, however, under pressure as its relative weight in world society 
is diminishing (Kjaer 2019b). The expansion and deepening of world society, expressed as 
modernization processes leading to functional differentiation becoming the dominant organizing 
principle in ever larger parts of the world (Luhmann 1997, 145ff.), means that the tragedy of the 
United States is that it is too small to dominate the world and too big not to try. At the same time, 
neither China nor the European Union are likely to be able to fill the gap. In legal terms, the 
consequence is that distinct worlds of law are on the rise. From trade and investment law to internet 
law, no single global framework à la WTO law or UN law will take hold. Rather, distinct EU-, 
Chinese-, and US-centric legal universes are likely to be the norm (Kjaer 2020c). 
 
This development is currently reinforcing ancient trends, as global law, including global economic 
law, is not singular and hierarchical. Instead, the core feature of global law is interlegality (Kjaer 
2019a). Global law is a decentered form of law located in-between-worlds, aimed at handling 
societal processes that are intercontextual and interlegal in nature. The law of global value chains 
is also illustrative in this case. Like colonial law before it, GVC law structures and enables global 
economic exchanges through connectivity norms. Connectivity norms are oriented toward the 
facilitation of transplantation—that is, the extraction, transmission, and incorporation of 
components of meaning from one legally structured context to another. This is, for example, the 
case within international trade and investment law and internal market law (Kjaer 2018). This 
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makes GVC law a third space, part of neither the outbound nor the inbound destination of 
transplanted components of meaning. GVC law is, in other words, liminal law.14 
 
A reconstruction of both universal imperial and colonial and GVC versions of global (economic) 
law as intercontextual law implies that conflicts of laws methodology becomes the most obvious 
legal lens through which to observe both past and present global society (Kjaer 2020c). Based on 
a mapping of the manifold global conflict lines between community-based living law, national, 
international, transnational, and global legal orders, a central challenge for legal scholarship is to 
develop a multidimensional conflict of laws approach complex enough to address the structural 
realities of world society (Fisher-Lescano and Teubner 2006; Joerges et al. 2011; Michaels and 
Pauwelyn 2012). A many-valued logic going beyond the binary national/international and bilateral 
inter-state lock-ins and a theory of polycontexturality is needed in order to capture the complex 
matrix of law in world society.15 Such an approach, in its substantial normative content, might 
have the safeguarding of the autonomy and integrity of multiple legal orders as its focus point—
that is, addressing asymmetries, transfers, and collisions between such orders. 
 
5.3.From Economism to Pluralism 
 
                                                            
14 Liminality was also central to colonial law. While it shares many characteristics with contemporary GVC 
law, a central difference is that colonial law was explicitly asymmetrical, skewed in favor of the colonizers 
through distinctions such as Christian/non-Christian and civilized/uncivilized and through unequal treaties. 
GVC law is, on the other hand, formally symmetric and bound up in a semantic of partnership. The degree 
to which this difference makes a difference in the real world is an empirical question, which, if adequately 
clarified, might highlight both the potentials and the limitations of law in global settings. See Kjaer 2018. 
15 In the sense of Gotthard Günther. See Günther 1978. 
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Gunther Teubner recently made a case for a nonreductionist concept of surplus value, arguing that 
equivalents to profit maximization can be found in all areas of society and not just in the 
economy—that is, in education, politics, religion, science, and so forth (Teubner 2020). Hauke 
Brunkhorst, coming from a left-Hegelian position, effectively made the same argument in 2014, 
arguing that the inbuilt contradictions and conflicts Marxists identify in the economy are present 
throughout society, just as different functional systems like religion, the economy, and education 
have been structurally dominant in different historical epochs (Brunkhorst 2014; Kjaer 2020c). 
 
This insight has several implications for the law of political economy. One is that structural 
Marxism and structural liberalism (i.e., neoliberalism) are each other’s mirror images, as they share 
a reductionist foundation. In the 1980s, structural liberalism succeeded structural Marxism as the 
fashionable ideology of the day. This, however, merely implied a switch from one side to the other 
of the same coin, insofar as both assume that society can be understood as being predominantly 
structured by economic interests and motivations, and that “society” can be considered the 
equivalent of the economy, or at least that society can be captured through an economic lens. Both 
ideologies saw and see the economy and private power, not law and legally constituted public 
power or any other part of society, as the driving force of societal evolution. For both, state action 
ultimately remains guided by economic interests, leaving little autonomy for law and legally 
constituted public power, or indeed for any other part of society (Kjaer 2020b, 2ff.; Kjaer 2020c). 
 
After being the underdog for a couple of decades, the Marxist version has been revived in recent 
years (e.g., Baars 2020; Tzouvala 2020). In the new version, links are frequently made to ethnic, 
gender, and racial justice issues. The theoretical rationale allowing for this link is, however, not 
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entirely clear, as the present-day attempt to give a privileged ontological status to identity-related 
concepts and the tendency to focus on individualistic rather than class-based perceptions and 
experiences is diametric to classical Marxist thinking. The only link seems to be a diffuse feeling 
of kinship based on the idea of a common enemy and a common taste for ideology-driven 
conflictuality.16 The failure to develop a nonreductionist theory of surplus value and the, at best, 
feeble link to classical Marxism might be considered a main reason for the move of self-declared 
critical and left-leaning scholars into the dead end of methodological culturalism. As already 
indicated, Polányi’s The Great Transformation has attained cult status in recent decades. In spite 
of its beauty, Polányi’s historical reconstruction of the stages in the autonomization of the economy 
and its reproductive logic and the consequences thereof remain—like the Marxist approach—
deeply skewed and reductionist by the failure to recognize that striving for value surplus and 
tendencies of autonomization and acceleration can be found throughout society and not just in the 
economy (Kjaer 2020c). The differentiation, autonomization, and acceleration of functionally 
delineated processes are observable in relation to a whole string of areas, such as art, health, 
education, intimacy, law, mass media, politics, religion, science, sports, and tourism, and not just 
in relation to the economy. These processes share their reliance on specific logics related to modern 
forms of organizing as expressed through concepts such as the Weberian iron cage and Lenin’s 
concept of the organizational society. In the most advanced parts of the world, the untapped 
emancipative potential of modern society is therefore primarily organizational rather than 
economic or political (Sciulli 2001). 
 
                                                            
16 For critical as well as embracing views, see Kumar et al. 2018. 
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When one departs from a multi-evolutionary perspective and multivalued logic rather than a one-
dimensional economism approach, the focus moves away from the singular endogenous logic of 
the economy to the multiple endogenous logics of a whole range of functional systems. This move, 
due to the plurality of systems, inevitably puts the coevolutionary logics and the relational 
dynamics between different systemic processes at the center. This enables a very different and far 
more sophisticated diagnosis of society than the ones provided by one-dimensional approaches 
such as those advanced by Hayek, Friedman, Marx, and Polányi, who all locate the driving force 
of society in the economic system. An alternative and sociologically sounder approach would be 
to acknowledge that humankind has tasted the apple of modernity, with the consequence that 
paradise has been lost and a return to a communitarian Gemeinschaft, as advocated by the latter-
day Polányists, or, more generally, the reduction of society to a single system is structurally 
impossible. This insight was already at the center of Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right 
and its ultimately failed attempt to reestablish unity on modern premises through the state. It was 
also central to the work of mid-nineteenth-century sociologists such as Émile Durkheim, Georg 
Simmel, Ferdinand Tönnies, and many others. Contemporary ideology-driven scholarship seems, 
in other words, to be struck by a remarkable degree of amnesia. 
  
An acceptance of the pluralistic structural condition of modernity implies a recognition of the need 
for a far more complex conceptual framework for describing society and its evolution than the 
ones provided by mainstream affirmative or critical approaches to market-based economies. Such 
a societal diagnosis would, as a minimum, have to differentiate between three questions that 
traditionally have been lumped together: How does society transform over time—that is, what are 
the drivers of change in society? How does socialization of subjects take place—that is, how do 
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subjects internalize norms, beliefs, and knowledge? How is societal coherency—that is, 
integration—established and maintained? To answer the first question, scientific and technological 
changes are probably the dominant driver. To answer the second, family and religion were 
traditionally dominant, and today education increasingly takes the prize as the most central 
dimension of society. To answer the third, the question of why some parts of world society look 
like Somalia and others like Switzerland, the question of institutions and, behind that, law and 
politics—that is, legally constituted public power—looms large. In short, while of course crucial, 
the economy has never been the central dimension of society. All systemic processes circulate 
around three dimensions: first, their reflexive self-maintenance (i.e., what they produce to maintain 
themselves); second, the prestation they produce vis-à-vis other systems (e.g., skills provided in 
the educational system enabling believers, citizens, or consumers to engage in their respective 
social roles within the systemic processes of religion, politics, or the economy); and finally, the 
function they produce vis-à-vis society as a whole (i.e., their contribution to the coherency of 
society). In this setup, different systemically organized processes are characterized by a different 
relative weighting. Some, though far from all, strands of religion and intimate relations barely 
exceed reflexive self-maintenance. The economy and education tend to focus on providing 
prestations crucial to most other systemic processes. The legal and political systems, on the other 
hand, remain centrally focused on societal coherency. Hence, the systematic overestimation of the 
role of economic processes in society as equally assumed in affirmative and critical approaches to 
a market-based economy reflects a profound lack of conceptual differentiation. One might argue 
that the use of the money medium as an integrated part of almost all social exchanges means that 
we live in a capitalist society. But the same argument could be made for educational skills or 
scientific and technological knowledge. Few societal exchanges would take place without basic 
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math skills or wheels turning. On the other hand, law and economics scholars and other structural 
liberalists conflate the prestations provided by economic reproduction with reflexive self-
maintenance or societal coherency. The core problem of the parts of world society most strongly 
subjected to structural liberalism, including law and economics, in the last four decades is the idea 
that reducing society to the issue of increasing economic prestation capacities somehow is good 
for reflexive self-maintenance and societal coherency. This problematic view, shared by self-
declared left-wingers as well as both right- and left-wing economism, tends to equate reflexive 
self-maintenance and societal coherency with economic prestation. 
  
The above pluralist perspective on society has implications for the function of law. While systems 
theory in the Luhmannian variant goes a long way in terms of its capacity to describe society 
through its reduction of society to endogenous processes, it fails to give an adequate account of 
intersystemic dynamics and the in-between worlds of the gray in gray (Luhmann 1997). A 
doubling of the theory, enabling it to equally capture the endogenous and the exogenous 
dimensions of systemic social processes, is needed. This is illustrated very well through the 
strategic role, as originally pointed out by Hegel and Durkheim, of intermediary institutions in 
society and the sort of enabling and stabilizing effect they have on systemic processes (Kjaer 
2015). In this context, the classical understanding of the function of law as focused upon the 
upholding of normative expectations (Luhmann 1993, 195ff) can be complemented by a focus on 
the dual functions of simultaneously differentiating and reconnecting systemic processes.  
 
The dual function linked to the simultaneous separation and reconnection of different systemically 
organized spheres of society originally emerged in the process leading to a differentiation of 
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religion and politics through law. Concretely, this differentiation occurred from the investiture 
controversy onward, and the controversy thereby became the mother of modern separation and 
reconnection processes, providing the template for modern law-based political economy 
(Brunkhorst 2014, 90ff.). This  double separating and reconnecting function gives law and legal 
instruments a strategic, though not superior, position in society as the grid aimed at enabling and 
restraining societal exchanges while respecting and nurturing the inner Eigenlogik and 
rationality of systemic processes throughout society. Hence, the simultaneous separation and 
reconnection of different systemically organized spheres of society through law are observable not 
just in relation to politics and the economy. Political economy, both as an epistemological 
approach and as an institutional reality, is, however, a very clear example. While both advocates 
and critics of a market-based economy tend to emphasize the fusion of economic and political 
processes, considering this fusion either problematic or desirable, the third way outlined here 
instead emphasizes the dual and literally simultaneous function of separating and reconnecting 
political and economic processes through legal means. Indeed, the law-based neocorporatism of 
the post–World War II era was the embodiment of this approach. Strongly formalized and across-
the-board frameworks of organizing capital, labor, and government and formalized frameworks of 
continued negotiations between them served as filters aimed at distilling meaning through the 
restructuring of specific social communications and exchanges into generalized and hence 
depersonalized components of public power. This prestation of law, in other words, served to 
organize convergence and synchronization between other partial segments of society—a prestation 
that implied guaranteeing the Eigenlogik and autonomy of the systemic processes in question 
through institutions such as private property rights, competition law, and the neutrality of 
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administrative law as well as obtaining functional validity though synchronization for society as a 
whole.17 
 
5.4. From Analytical Formalism to Sociological Formalism  
 
Formalism is traditionally associated with nineteenth-century classical legal thought, advancing a 
“scientific,” “objective,” and internalist view on law aimed at establishing systemic coherency—
an approach that relied on notions of formal equality derived from transcendental philosophy and 
that, especially in the US context, was heavily criticized by legal realist scholars for its speculative 
character. As mentioned, in this context, Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer consider law and 
economics as a neoformalist approach detaching legal reasoning from social reality, instead relying 
on formalist analytical modeling derived from economic theory (Nourse and Shaffer 2009; 
Frerichs 2020)—a form of speculative theorizing acting as a deductive form of casuistry relying 
on prestructured utilitarian values and crude methodological individualist assumptions.  
 
Sociological formalism—that is, the empirical study of social forms such as institutions, 
organizations, networks, and social roles—represents a far more advanced approach. Social 
communication flows come in looser or tighter versions. Loosely coupled communications have 
social reality but are characterized by blurred boundaries, short life spans, and sparsely condensed 
meaning. Tightly coupled communications, on the other hand, imply clear boundaries, reiterated 
processes, and condensed forms of meaning. As studied since Pythagoras, many different forms 
                                                            
17 In addition, neocorporatism was aimed at substituting public power with the help of law for clientelism, 
paternalism, and private interests. This made neocorporatist institutions specifically modern, as abstraction 
advanced through depersonalization, besides functional differentiation and a reconstruction of time as 
linear, is the central feature of modernity. 
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of form building are observable within many different mediums of a physical, biological, and 
social nature (Åkerstrøm 2019). In the social world, the conversion of loosely coupled 
communications into tightly coupled communications is the built-in purpose of social formations 
such as institutions, organizations, networks, and social roles, enabling increased complexity, 
structuring of expectations, and dynamic stability (Karafillidis 2010). Many of these social forms 
exist without relying on or only sparsely relying on law. In many instances, however, law provides 
a particular prestation for many nonlegal social processes by rendering form to them. For a social 
exchange to be considered an economic exchange, it needs to take place with the framework of a 
contract of similar legal form. For something to be considered a legitimate expression of political 
preferences, it needs to unfold within a voting procedure or other legally structured framework. In 
both cases, it is the legal framing that transforms a generic social communication into something 
that we can call specifically an economic, a political, or, for that matter, a religious or a scientific 
phenomenon. As such, law can be considered as enabling social processes through the prestation 
of form giving. The rather old idea of the New Haven LPE movement concerning the law’s 
constitutive function vis-à-vis the economy is, in other words, not particular to the economy but 
rather a general feature of many institutionalized social processes. Hence, form giving might be 
considered a central prestation of law, with a prevalence similar to the use of money, educational 
skills, or technology in social communications. It is, however, a kind of form giving that remains 
“hidden” in most cases, as the full force of the law is activated only in conflictual settings 
remaining largely invisible in day-to-day operations. In spite of, or maybe exactly because of, its 
inconspicuous impact on day-to-day operations, the form-giving prestation of law comes with a 
decisive epistemological twist: form giving is a condition for observation, thereby making it 
constitutive in a more fundamental sense. While the political system might instruct the law through 
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legislation, and while economic and other concerns might force the hand of the law in concrete 
cases, form giving through law ascribes something a specific political or economic quality. 
Political power, for example, does not exist outside the law; only violence does (Arendt 1970; 
Brunkhorst 2014, 127). In this particular sense, we might say that it is not the political or the 
economic that constitutes the law; it is the law that constitutes the political and the economic 
because they become observable only as particularly political or economic through the legal form. 
The prestation of law is, in other words, of a far more fundamental character than economic 
prestations, which tend to merely grease the wheels of noneconomic social processes. 
 
The prestation of law in the transformation of loosely coupled communications into tightly coupled 
communications—that is, the “formative” part of transformative law—is where the immediate 
transformative potential lies. However, the potential of law goes further as the legal system, in 
spite of its own blind spots, has a strategic location in society, making it the central infrastructural 
grid giving structure to world society—a grid that represents the “trans” part of transformative 
law. Apart from form giving—that is, constituting social phenomena in their enabling and limiting 
dimensions—and the material substance the law is oriented against, the third dimension of 
triangular dialectics concerns the transcendence of forms—that is, the rendering of compatibility 
between forms. As the social world is a processual world—that is, existing in the medium of time 
and constantly in the making through form giving—this is very much a question of 
synchronization. While a news cycle, the covering of a story by mass media from first to last 
instance, often is extremely short, business cycles are considered to run for up to sixty years 
(Kondratieff and Stolper 1935). A political cycle tends to follow the four- or five-year election 
period or, alternatively, five-year plans, as in communist political systems. Science and technology 
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life cycles are often of a thirty-year duration, and religious cycles are intended to be eternal. In this 
context, the function of law becomes a question of achieving compatibility through the 
synchronization of different time logics. In the context of political economy, several examples can 
be mentioned: the legal structuring of institutional formats such as neocorporatist frameworks for 
continued tripartite negotiations between employers, employees, and the state; the structuring of 
independent central banks located in between the economic and the political system; corporate 
social responsibility frameworks as well as supply chain liability doctrines. These are all examples 
of legally framed attempts to establish compatibility between different modes of operating 
originating within different systemic processes in society—examples that represent prestations 
involving partial segments of society but that provide the basis for generalized legal principles and 
approaches that have profound effects for society in its entirety.  
 
Over the last decades, world society has, however, undergone immense increases in complexity, 
massive accelerations, and spatial expansions. The amount of information published and stored, 
the pace of technological developments, and the convolution of the challenges facing society go 
far beyond what law in its current form can absorb. The core characteristic of world society in 
recent decades is that the material substance of social processes has exceded the legal-institutional 
frames and forms that emerged in the immediate World War II period. Mass media has morphed 
into social media, economic products into experiences, multinational companies into global value 
chains, and scientific contributions into blog posts. In short, the crisis of the West is essentially 
about the absence of tight framings of social processes. Form giving through law is not just about 
enabling social processes but just as much about limiting such processes, and the crisis of the West 
might be considered linked to the increased failure of the limiting function of law. Constitutionally, 
38 
 
as well as in every legal field from company law to family law and internet law, the challenge is 
thus to increase the internal complexity, speed, and reach of law in a manner that enables it to 
capture loose social processes and give them a tight form. Informal governance and “managerial” 
soft law arrangements, for example, which emerged as a result of the inadequacies of existing 
institutional forms, are in demand of a new, tight legal form. The challenge posed both by 
neoliberalism and by its demise is thus mainly a surface problem, as the law is faced with a far 
bigger challenge: namely, to reinvent itself to stay relevant under the structural conditions of 
twenty-first century world society (Kjaer 2020c). 
6. Conclusion 
The Western world faces a crisis that might end up being terminal in the sense that the term 
Western world will no longer be meaningful. The crisis is essentially about the loss of Western 
privilege and structural dominance in an increasingly globalized world society. One symptom of 
this, observable across society, is a retreat to ontological concepts of identity. Both the defenders 
and those critical of the so far dominant forms of societal privileges resort to obscure identity-
based worldviews. On both sides, an incoherent cocktail of theoretical humbug provides the shaky 
but nonetheless fertile foundation for antagonistic, conflictual, and exclusionary approaches 
threatening to rip society apart. This return of polarization is, however, largely a surface problem, 
as far more profound structural issues are at play. The integrative grid of society provided by law 
has been challenged and faced with erosion in many different settings as the legal-institutional 
frames of the post–World War II world have faltered and without new ones emerging or with the 
new ones insufficiently grounded and coherent. This is not only observable in relation to the legally 
structured relationship between economy and politics. The triangular relationship between law, 
economy and politics have to be considered a central aspect of a larger societal-wide constellation. 
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thereby providing the incentive for a rethinking of the law of political economy under the structural 
conditions of the twenty-first century. A rethinking that might be done under the heading of 
transformative law and with the aim of developing a new understanding of the function and 
concept of law. This endeavor implies, at a minimum, four moves: firstly, forsaking 
methodological individualism and a move toward a substantial concept of world society; secondly, 
abandoning the concept of hegemony, substituting for it a concept of interlegality; thirdly, rejecting 
the reductionism of economism at the center of both affirmative and critical approaches to market-
based economic organization, moving instead toward a pluralist perspective providing a far more 
nuanced and sophisticated analysis of the role of different societal logics on society as a whole; 
fourthly and finally, moving beyond the sort of analytical formalism currently dominating 
economics, philosophy, and political science, replacing it with empirical (i.e., historical), grounded 
sociological formalism.  
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